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FIRST CIRCUIT
Alexander v. Brigham & Women’s Physicians Org., Inc., 513 F.3d 37
(1st Cir. 2008)
Editor’s Note—This case resolves “two issues of first impression
concerning the scope of ERISA’s exemption for so-called top-hat
deferred compensation plans.” Id. at 39.
QUESTION ONE: What constitutes a “select group” under ERISA’s
top-hat provision in a deferred compensation plan. Id. at 43.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit first addressed the statutory language in
ERISA, finding that the top-hat provision “applies only if, among other
things, a plan is maintained for the primary benefit of ‘a select group of
management or highly compensated employees.’” Id. The court then
examined the Congressional intent behind the statutory phrases flanking
the provision—“maintained” and “highly compensated”—concluding
that a plain reading of the statute indicates Congress, when carving out
the top-hat provision, considered those employees who “realistically
have the capacity to benefit from it.” Id. at 44.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “[t]o come within the
compass of the top-hat provision, the employer must be able to show a
substantial disparity between the compensation paid to members of the
top-hat group and the compensation paid to all other workers.” Id. at 46.
QUESTION TWO: Whether ERISA implicitly requires that every
individual in the “select group” possesses bargaining power sufficient to
negotiate the terms of the plan. Id. at 46.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit initially addressed the statutory
language of the top-hat provision, asserting that Congress never
mentioned bargaining power in the statute. Id. Further, the court noted
that “the statutory language contains no indication that Congress
contemplated that courts would consider employees’ ability to bargain
over the terms of their deferred compensation plans, either individually
or collectively, when measuring the bona fides of a select group and
determining the applicability of the top-hat provision.” Id. at 46–47. The
court reasoned that “[a]lthough Congress’s rationale for fashioning the
exemption was that the members of a ‘select group of management or
highly compensated employees’ could fend for themselves, the statute,
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by its terms, does not purport to require proof of power of any sort.” Id.
at 48.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit concluded that “there is no
requirement of individual bargaining power to qualify for the top-hat
provision.” Id.
Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: What is the standard of review to be applied to an air
carrier’s decision to refuse transport to a passenger under 49 U.S.C. §
44902(b). Id. at 2–3.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit emphasized that “§ 44902(b) does not
merely create a defense,” but rather, “the statute is an affirmative grant of
permission to the air carrier.” Id. at 30. The court also found that “[i]t is
the plaintiff who carries the burden to show that § 44902(b) is
inapplicable.” Id. The court recognized that the 2nd and 9th Circuits have
adopted an “arbitrary or capricious” standard for evaluating decisions of
air carriers and that such a standard “reconciles the primary priority of
safety with other important policies, such as . . . prohibitions on racial
discrimination.” Id. at 31–32.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “an air carrier’s decisions
to refuse transport under § 44902(b) are not subject to liability unless the
decision is arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 32.
Larson v. Howell, 513 F.3d 325 (1st Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the state crime of negligent vehicular
homicide qualifies as a ‘criminal act’ which would cap a debtor’s
homestead exemption to $125,000 under the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).” Id. at
327.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit interpreted the language in
§522(q)(1)(B)(iv) of the BAPCPA, which applied a $125,000 cap on the
homestead exemption to “‘any criminal act, intentional tort, or willful or
reckless misconduct that caused serious physical injury or death . . . ,” to
include state law criminal negligence. Id. at 328. The court found that
the word “or” in the statute signified that criminal acts were to be
considered as a separate trigger to the subsection, independent of any
intent or recklessness. Id. The court also dismissed an argument that “a
debtor must be ‘convicted’ of a ‘criminal act’ in order for
522(q)(1)(B)(iv) to apply,” holding instead that the provision “applies
wherever the debtor’s debt ‘arises from . . . any criminal act.” Id. at 330.
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Further, the court also found that “an admission of facts sufficient for a
finding of guilt” was enough to trigger the provision. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that the $125,000 cap on the
homestead provision imposed by § 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) of the BAPCPA
applies to crimes of negligence in which a debtor’s debt arises from the
criminal act. Id.
SECOND CIRCUIT
Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether an employer’s pre-approval rule, which
required advance notice and authorization for overtime payments to its
employees, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Id. at 17.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit first examined the Department of
Labor regulation addressing such rules, stipulating that “[i]n all such
cases it is the duty of the management to exercise its control and see that
the work is not performed if it does not want it to be performed . . . The
mere promulgation of a rule against such work is not enough.
Management has the power to enforce the rule and must make every
effort to do so.” Id. The court then followed the precedents of the
Supreme Court and the 11th Circuit, which held that an “agency could
not avoid overtime compensation simply by adopting a policy against
overtime and issuing periodic warnings.” Id. at 289.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that an employer’s preapproval rule violates the FLSA because “employees cannot waive the
overtime protections granted them in the FLSA without nullifying the
Act’s purposes and setting aside the legislative goals Congress wanted
effectuated.” Id. at 290.
Ogunwomoju v. United States, 512 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether a petitioner in immigration detention or
under an order of removal as a consequence of a state conviction is ‘in
custody’ within the meaning of the statute providing for a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge such a conviction.” Id. at 70.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit distinguished a petitioner who “is
currently serving a state sentence” and “seeks to challenge a final order
of removal,” from a petitioner whose “sentence imposed for a conviction
has completely expired.” Id. at 74–75. The court supported this
conclusion by noting that “the collateral consequences of that conviction
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are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the
purposes of a habeas attack on it.” Id. at 75. Finally, the court stated that
the statute in question, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), is jurisdictional and requires
that “habeas petitioners be in custody under a state conviction or
sentence when they file for habeas relief . . . .” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “immigration detention is
not ‘custody’ for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction to consider a
habeas petition challenging a state court conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.” Id. at 70.
THIRD CIRCUIT
Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether a United States citizen could invoke alienage
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) if she possessed dual
citizenship. Id. at 399.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that a number of circuits have
held that “for a dual national citizen, only the American nationality is
relevant for purposes of diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” Id. The court
applied the 5th Circuit’s reasoning in Coury v. Prot, which concluded
that “the dual citizen should not be allowed to invoke alienage
jurisdiction because this would give him an advantage not enjoyed by
native-born American citizens.” Id. at 400. Furthermore, the court agreed
with the 5th Circuit that affording alienage jurisdiction to an American
dual citizen would frustrate its purpose of allowing foreign subjects to
avoid real or perceived bias in the state courts. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a dual national could not
utilize foreign nationality for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because
only the American nationality of a dual national is recognized in such
cases. Id.
Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95 (3d. Cir. 2008)
Editor’s Note—This case resolves two issues of first impression
involving an Interstate Compact Concerning Parole and Probation
between Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
QUESTION ONE: Whether an Interstate Compact Concerning
Parole and Probation (“the Parole Compact”) between Pennsylvania and
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New Jersey is state law subject only to state jurisdiction or federal law
subject to jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 103.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit first applied a four factor test, finding:
(1) “the need to assert cross-border control of people subject to the
jurisdiction of the criminal justice system . . .” is within the
Constitution’s Compact Clause; (2) the Parole Compact received
Congressional consent; and (3) the need for interstate cooperation made
the subject matter appropriate for Congressional legislation. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the Parole Compact was
federal law as well as state law because it was a congressionallysanctioned compact. Id.
QUESTION TWO: Whether an interstate parole compact provides a
parolee with common law contractual rights as a third-party beneficiary.
Id.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit found that, because an interstate
compact is a contract with the states as parties, federal law controls in the
absence of a federal statute to the contrary. Id. at 106. The court noted
that “[i]n addition to the parties to a contract, ‘third-party beneficiaries’
of the contract can also enforce its terms.” Id. The court applied two
restatement tests for third-party beneficiary status: (1) whether the parties
have indicated in the agreement that the third party is a beneficiary; or
(2) whether circumstances compel recognition of third-party status to
effectuate the intention of the parties. Id. The court found that the parolee
was not explicitly mentioned in the agreement as a third-party
beneficiary and there was no intention to confer third-party status upon
the parolee set forth in the compact’s statement of purpose. Id. at 106–
07.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that although a compact is
treated as a contract, parolees are not third-party beneficiaries to the
Parole Compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania according to both
the explicit terms of the compact and the intent of the parties, as set forth
in the compact’s statement of purpose. Id.
Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether early retirement payments made by the
University of Pittsburgh to its tenured faculty are taxable as ‘wages’
under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”).” Id. at 166.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that the “weight of authority
holds that compensation paid to an employee for services to her
employer constitutes wages under FICA regardless of whether it is
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prospective (for lost earning potential), or retrospective (as a reward for
past service).” Id. at 171.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held “that the relinquishment of
tenure rights—although a condition precedent to the payments—does not
alter the Plan payments’ character as compensation for services, and
therefore as wages.” Id.
United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the miscalculation of advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range is rendered harmless where the imposed sentence fell
into the “overlap” between the incorrect and correct Guidelines range
used by the sentencing court. Id. at 216.
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that in the “typical case in which
an error in the calculating of Sentencing Guidelines has been held
harmless, the sentence was dictated not by the erroneously calculated
Guideline, but by a statutory minimum or maximum or another properly
calculated Guideline.” Id. Although the court acknowledged that other
courts had adopted an “overlapping range” justification, it concluded that
“overlap” does not inevitably render an error in the Guidelines
calculation harmless. Id. Moreover, the court agreed with the other courts
of appeals which had similarly concluded that “the selection of an
incorrect Guidelines range was plain error even though the actual
sentence happened to fall within the correct Guidelines range.” Id. at
217. Specifically, the court indicated that a mere overlap is not
conclusive, and that “the record must show that the sentencing judge
would have imposed the same sentence under a correct Guidelines range,
that is, that the sentencing Guidelines range did not affect the sentence
actually imposed.” Id. at 216. Thus, the court concluded that although the
overlap may be useful, it is the sentencing judge’s reasoning and not
mere overlap that will be determinative. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that the miscalculation of
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range is not rendered harmless by the
fact that the sentence imposed is within overlapping incorrect and correct
ranges in the Guidelines. Id.
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FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether the term “person” as written in 18 U.S.C. §
876(b), outlining the elements of extortion, includes an entity that is a
non-living person, specifically, the University of Virginia, which is “an
arm of the sovereign, i.e., the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Id. at 460.
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit first examined the plain language of the
word “person” in the statute, finding that “[a]lthough [some portions of
the statute] are realistically limited to live persons, it is entirely
reasonable to conclude that an artificial entity, such as UVA, can be the
victim of an extortion demand.” Id. at 461. The court then considered the
ordinary usage of “person” and noted that the Webster’s Dictionary
definition includes “legal entit[ies] recognized by law as the subject of
rights and duties.” Id. The court then rejected the contention that the
“rule of uniform usage” should control, stating that “if a statutory term
has multiple commonly understood and accepted meanings, among
which a speaker may alternate without confusion, the rule of uniform
usage will readily yield.” Id. Next, the court disallowed an interpretation
based on the “Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, which includes entities like
corporations (but not governmental entities) in its definition of ‘person’.”
Id. at 462. The court determined that the University of Virginia “is more
than an extension of the Commonwealth of Virginia and, under Virginia
law, it is a corporation.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding,
finding that “the district court properly observed in assessing this
contention, there is nothing in § 876(b) to indicate that Congress
intended to protect only living persons from the extortion demands
criminalized in § 876(b). . . . In context, it is clear that Congress, by
using the term ‘any person’ in the Extortion Element, intended ‘to
penalize every extortion demand by mail which is coupled with an
express threat or with any language or expression which carries with it
the reasonable connotation of a threat.’” Id. at 464.
Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb) of the Social Security
Act creates an enforceable right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at
211.
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ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit applied the Blessing test to section
1396a(bb) as a whole to find that: (1) Congress intended the statute “to
benefit” Rural Health Clinics (“RHCs”); (2) the use of the phrase ‘shall
provide for payment’ “is not unduly vague or amorphous such that the
judiciary cannot enforce it”; and (3) “the language unambiguously binds
the states as indicated by the repeated use of ‘shall.’” Id. The court
further noted that § 1396a(bb), as required by Gonzaga, “contains
rights-creating language because it specifically designates the
beneficiaries—the RHCs—and it mandates action on the part of the
states.” Id. at 212. The court stated that “§ 1396a(bb) has an individual
focus rather than an aggregate focus on institutional policy or practice.”
Id. The court found that the statute’s focus was in stark contrast to the
‘policy or practice’ language present in the provision interpreted in
Gonzaga. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that “the language of §
1396a(bb) and the case law interpreting Medicaid provisions of similar
import in light of the Blessing factors” indicate that § 1396a(bb) “creates
an enforceable right under § 1983.” Id.
Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 518 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether, under TILA (“Truth in Lending Act”) and
HOEPA (“Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act”), the definition
of ‘creditor,’ as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f), includes a person who
acted only as a mortgage broker in the particular transaction, but who
had acted as a lender in the past for unrelated transactions.” Id. at 267.
ANALYSIS: The 4th Circuit noted that “the universal definition of
‘creditor’ in the first sentence of § 1602(f), the substantive and linguistic
connections between the first and last sentences, the differential
terminology between ‘creditor’ and ‘mortgage broker,’ the history of the
last sentence’s enactment, and common sense” led it to conclude that the
last sentence was not a standalone definition but rather “a particularizing
clarification of the first sentence, which defines ‘creditor’ in an
installment loan as the person to whom the obligation is initially
payable.” Id. at 272. The court also considered Regulation Z,
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to assist in applying §
1602(f), and noted that it did not include a mortgage broker who does not
extend credit in the transaction as a ‘creditor.’ Id. Finally, the 4th Circuit
found that the last sentence of § 1602(f) “explained the first prong of the
‘creditor’ definition in the first sentence—what it means to ‘regularly
extend’ credit—in circumstances when high-cost mortgages are
involved.” Id.
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CONCLUSION: The 4th Circuit held that, based on both section
1602(f) and Regulation Z promulgated under it, a person who acted only
as a mortgage broker is not a creditor. Id. at 273.

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether [an] alien’s conviction for misuse of a social
security number under 42 U.S.C.S. § 408(a)(7)(A) was a Crime
Involving Moral Turpitude (“CIMT”). Id. at 390.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that it has “repeatedly
emphasized that crimes whose essential elements involve fraud or
deception tend to be CIMTs.” Id. at 391. Additionally, the court
recognized the Supreme Court’s declaration that “fraud has consistently
been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that
American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within
the scope of moral turpitude.” Id. The court reasoned that the inherent
nature of the crime is more important than the specific circumstances
surrounding the individual transgression, and that in general, “courts
have held that intentionally deceiving the government involves moral
turpitude.” Id. at 392. The court declined to follow the 9th Circuit’s
decision in Beltran-Tirado v. I.N.S., exempting social security misuse
from CIMTs, explaining that it was not binding precedent and
erroneously expanded “a narrow exemption beyond what Congress
intended.” Id. at 393.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “[m]isuse of a social
security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A) falls within the
circuit’s understanding of the definition of CIMT.” Id.
Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether a fugitive alien may invoke the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine “to dismiss a petition for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals decision . . . .” Id. at 835.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s
framework for the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, adopting the same
questions to determine when its use is justified: “whether it may be
impossible for the court to enforce any judgment that it renders”;
whether “by fleeing custody, the defendant is thought to have waived or
abandoned his right to an appeal”; whether “dismiss[al] of a fugitive’s
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case is thought to ‘discourage [] the felony of escape and encourage []
voluntary surrenders’”; and whether the “dismissal of the case furthers
the court’s ‘interest in efficient practice.’” Id. In addition, the 5th Circuit
remarked that “the criminal defendant’s escape is thought to represent an
affront to the dignity and authority of the court.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit extended the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine “to the immigration context [when] the petitioners are fugitive
aliens who have evaded custody and failed to comply with a removal
order.” Id.
United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a state’s presumption of intent can create a
drug trafficking offense under . . . [§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) of the United States
Sentencing] Guidelines . . . .” Id. at 179.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit recognized that the issue was one of
first impression for it, and that a split existed among the circuit courts of
appeals. Id. Following the reasoning of the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits,
the 5th Circuit held that “[s]entencing enhancements are defined by
federal, not state, law.” Id. at 180. The court reasoned that the Guidelines
“could have defined a drug trafficking offense based on the quantity of
drugs possessed, . . . [but] [i]nstead, they require that a state prove an
intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the defendant’s state
conviction did “not constitute a drug trafficking offense” under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether, under federal immigration law, the principle
of “derivative beneficiaries” allows a petitioner seeking “withholding of
removal” to rely on a spouse’s ground for “withholding of removal.” Id.
at 681.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit first looked to the decisions of the 2nd,
6th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits, finding that they each noted (and held, in
the 11th Circuit) that “withholding of removal does not afford derivative
relief to members of an alien’s family.” Id. The court next examined the
intent of Congress to find that “no evidence in the language of the statute
to indicate that Congress intended to extend the relief afforded by
withholding of removal to an alien’s spouse or minor children without an
independent ground for granting such relief to them.” Id. at 682. The 5th
Circuit also recognized that Federal regulations involving withholding of
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removal supported the finding. Id. Finally, the court indicated that the I589 application for withholding of removal only referenced the spouse
and minor children of the alien because it could serve as an application
for asylum, noting that the application clearly stated that “[w]ithholding
of removal does not apply to any spouse or child included in the
application.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit agreed with the Board of
Immigration Appeals, holding “as a matter of law, ‘there are no
derivative beneficiaries for an application for withholding of removal.’”
Id. at 681.
United States v. Huy Tan Nguyen, 507 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court has the authority to grant a
new trial on a ground other than one raised by a defendant’s motion
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.” Id. at 837.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted a recent 3rd Circuit holding “that
a district court is without the authority to grant a motion for new trial on
a basis not raised by the defendant.” Id. at 839. The court acknowledged
that the drafters added the words “on motion of a defendant” to Rule 33
at the same time they “expanded the district court’s power to grant a new
trial in civil cases, specifically stating in Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that a new trial could be granted for ‘a reason not
stated in the motion.’” Id. The 5th Circuit found the 3rd Circuit’s
reasoning persuasive, explaining that “the drafters would have inserted
similar language in the criminal rules if they intended a district court to
have the power to grant a new trial on a basis not stated in the motion for
new trial.” Id.
Conclusion: The 5th Circuit agreed with the 3rd Circuit to hold that
a district court “does not have the authority to grant a motion for new
trial under Rule 33 on a basis not raised by the defendant.” Id.
Trinity Marine Prods., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 512 F.3d 198, (5th Cir.
2007)
QUESTION: Whether there is a constitutional right “to contest an
administrative warrant’s validity in federal court before its execution.”
Id. at 7.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that the Plaintiff Trinity’s “right
finds no support in the Constitution’s text or history and has never been
blessed by the Supreme Court.” The court further observed that “the best
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reading of the leading Supreme Court case on point, Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., is decidedly against Trinity’s claim.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “there is no constitutional
right to a pre-execution contempt hearing and . . . administrative
warrants, like criminal warrants, can be executed by means of reasonable
force.” Id.
In re Wallace; Wallace v. Rogers, 513 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether the homestead exemption cap applies to a
homestead interest established within the 1,215-day period preceding the
filing of the bankruptcy petition despite the fact that the debtor acquired
title to the property before that statutory period.” Id. at 215.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that “Congress could have
defined all [of the] debtors’ exemptions to be whatever they would have
been 1215 days before the filing of the petition. Instead, Congress
defined the cap more narrowly.” Id. at 227. The court further stated that
text of the statute and its legislative history indicated that “the term
‘interest’ refers to vested economic interests in the property that were
acquired by the debtor within the 1,215-day period preceding the filing
of the petition.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that the defendant was
“entitled to [the] full homestead exemption.” Id.
Bocchi Ams. Assocs. Inc. v. Commerce Fresh Mktg. Inc., 515 F.3d 383
(5th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an oral agreement is sufficient to effect a
waiver or forfeiture of PACA trust rights.” Id. at 390.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit adopted the rule “that waiver or
forfeiture of PACA trust rights by entering into an extension agreement
requires an agreement in writing.” Id. at 390–91. The court declined to
accept the viewpoint of the 2nd Circuit, and instead agreed with a
majority of other circuits deciding the issue. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the “waiver or forfeiture of
PACA trust rights by entering into an extension agreement requires an
agreement in writing.” Id.
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Ayanbadejo v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether the district court erred in granting the
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because § 1252(a)(2)(B) precluded its review” of the plaintiffs’ I-130
petition and I-485 application. Id. at 276.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that its decision in Zhao v.
Gonzales, which provided guidance for the interpretation of
§1252(a)(2)(B), precisely identified “which discretionary decisions are
beyond judicial review.” Id. at 277. The court remarked that “section
1252(a)(2)(B)(i) simply does not include I-130 petition determinations in
the discretionary category that expressly includes determinations of I-485
applications.” Id. at 278. Consequently, the court held that because
“[d]eterminations regarding the validity of marriage for I-130 petition
purposes are not discretionary within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B),”
they are thus subject to review by courts. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit concluded that “[a]lthough the
district court did not have jurisdiction to review the determinations made
with respect to [the husband’s] I-485 application, the court did have
jurisdiction to review the determinations made with respect to [the
wife’s] I-130 petition.” Id. at 276.
Wagstaff v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether Congress waived the sovereign immunity of
the United States by enacting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”). Id. at 662.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit noted that “[i]n order to hale the federal
government into a court proceeding, a plaintiff must show that there has
been a valid waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 664. Further, the court
indicated that such a waiver must be unequivocally expressed in the text
of the statute and would not be implied. Id. Additionally, the court
remarked that such a waiver “will be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Id. Thus, the court stated that “[a]bsent
a waiver of sovereign immunity, the federal government is immune from
suit.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that the FDCPA “does not
contain an unequivocal and express waiver of sovereign immunity,” and
that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in this case. Id.
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SIXTH CIRCUIT
Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether courts should analyze disparate-impact claims
against private defendants under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) using the
modified burden-shifting framework utilized in Title VII disparateimpact cases, or the framework established in Arthur v. City of Toledo,
when analyzing disparate-impact cases against governmental defendants.
Id. at 371, 372.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit analyzed the three-step burden-shifting
framework applied in disparate-impact claims under Title VII. Id. at 372.
The court next explained that a number of circuits, “relying on the
analogy between Title VII and the FHA,” had used the Title VII burdenshifting approach for dealing with disparate-impact claims under the
FHA. Id.
The 6th Circuit then considered the framework it had applied in a
disparate-impact case against governmental defendants under the FHA in
Arthur v. City of Toledo, noting that it had “not mention[ed] the burdenshifting framework or the elements of a prima facie case” in that case. Id.
Rather, the court explained it had applied a “three-factor balancing
approach” which focused on “(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing
of discriminatory effect; (2) the strength of the defendant’s interest in
taking the challenged action; and (3) whether the plaintiff seeks to
compel the defendant affirmatively to provide housing for members of
minority groups or merely restrain the defendant from interfering with
individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.” Id. at
372–73.
The appellate court reasoned that these two approaches were
complimentary, and therefore merged the frameworks, noting that “the
Arthur standard nicely captures the inquiry that we must perform at the
third step in the burden-shifting framework.” Id. at 373. The court,
however, remarked that the third Arthur factor was “not relevant to
claims against private defendants.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that “disparate-impact
claims against private defendants under the FHA should be analyzed
using a form of the [Title VII] burden-shifting framework” that
incorporates the Arthur factors by considering the “strength of the
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plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect against the strength of the
defendant’s interest in taking the challenged action.” Id. at 374.
United States v. James T. Fore, II, 507 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: [W]hether the district court properly denied
defendant’s request for a two-level reduction in his base offense level
pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2G2(b)(1) (2005), which allows such a reduction
if the ‘defendant’s conduct was limited to the receipt or solicitation of
material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor; and . . . the
defendant did not intend to traffic in, or distribute, such material.’” Id. at
413.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted the defendant’s argument that it it
was “undisputed that the pornographic images traveled in interstate
commerce, [therefore] the pivotal issue is whether there was
‘distribution’ of the materials . . .” Id. at 415. The court concluded that
the Sentencing Guidelines expressly permit the pertinent reduction in
base offense level only if, among other requirements, the defendant’s
conduct is “limited in scope to the receipt or solicitation of material
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor . . .” Id. Here, the court
found that the defendant’s conduct “was not limited to the receipt or
solicitation of pornographic materials, but also encompassed the
transportation of materials involving the sexual exploitation of a minor in
interstate commerce . . . an offense that is separate and distinct from . . .
the mere receipt or solicitation of pornography . . .” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that because the “defendant’s
conduct was not ‘limited’ to the receipt or solicitation of materials
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor, he does not qualify for the
two-level reduction under the plain language of U.S.S.G §
2G2.2(b)(1)(B).” Id.
Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether plaintiffs’ counsel has standing to appeal a
district court’s order of attorneys’ fees under the False Claims Act
(“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000). Id. at 614.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that the because the plaintiffs had
fully resolved their FCA claims regarding contingency fees and
attorneys’ fees prior to appeal, therefore any additional award would
only affect the interests of the plaintiffs’ counsel. Id. at 615. Further, the
court observed that counsel had suffered a putative injury in fact since
district court’s award of attorney fees was lower than the amount sought

2008]

First Impressions

379

in the petition. Id. Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs implicitly
approved the entire amount sought by counsel when it filed the original
fee petition for the full amount, concluding that “[t]o refuse standing,
therefore, would be to tantamount to ‘exalt[ing] form over substance.’”
Id. at 615.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held “that [counsel] does have
standing to bring this appeal,” reiterating its earlier observation that
“[w]hen they are the real parties in interest, attorneys are entitled to their
day in court.” Id. at 616.
Pennington v. Metro. Gov’t, 511 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether a breathalyzer test administered to an offduty police officer amounts to an unconstitutional seizure.” Id. at 651.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit analogized the case before it to a
decision rendered by the 7th Circuit in Driebel v. City of Milwaukee and
agreed that “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment does not protect against
the threat of job loss, the relevant constitutional inquiry must focus on
whether reasonable people in the position of the subordinate officers
would have feared seizure or detention if they had refused to obey the
commands given by their superior officers.” Id. at 652. The court also
noted that the plaintiff admitted he complied with the orders of his
superior officers due to his fear of losing his job. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that “Pennington was not
seized when he submitted to the breathalyzer test” because “Pennington
himself did not fear seizure or detention; instead, he was afraid he would
be terminated or suspended.” Id.
United States v Goins, 516 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether pretrial detention with respect to an
indictment that later yields a conviction tolls the running of a period of
supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624.” Id. at 417.
ANALYSIS: As a preliminary matter, the 6th Circuit found that the
plain meaning of a defendant’s “release” under section 3624(e) was
defined by the Supreme Court as “not commenc[ing] until an individual
‘is released from imprisonment,’” and thus required a “strict temporal”
interpretation, “rather than “some fictitious earlier time.” Id. at 420. The
court then rejected the 9th Circuit’s reasoning that the term “imprison” in
section 3624(e) inherently requires a penalty or sentence, finding that
such a reading would render the “in connection with a conviction”
portion of the statute superfluous. Id. at 421. Instead, the court indicated
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that the plain meaning encompassed a broader dictionary definition
including “detain in custody,” which could include a pretrial detention.
Id. at 422.
The court then buttressed this conclusion using the connection
between pretrial detention and later conviction iterated in 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b), that “credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for
any time [the defendant] has spent in official detention prior to the date
the sentence commences . . . as a result of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that “when a defendant is
held for thirty days or longer in pretrial detention, and he is later
convicted for the offense for which he was held, and his pretrial
detention is credited as time served toward his sentence, then the pretrial
detention is ‘in connection with’ a conviction and tolls the period of
supervised release under § 3624.” Id. at 417.
Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433
(6th Cir. 2008)
Editor’s Note—This case resolves two issues of first impression
concerning the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
QUESTION ONE: “[W]hether an individual member of an LLC that
is engaged in debt collection may be held liable under the FDCPA (“Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692) without piercing the
corporate veil.” Id. at 435.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit recognized a circuit split over the issue,
noting that the 7th Circuit decided that “a shareholder, officer of
employee of a corporate debt collector may not be held personally liable
without meeting the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil.”
Id. at 436. In contrast, the court also acknowledged several district courts
that concluded “where a shareholder, officer, or employee of a
corporation is personally involved in the debt collection at issue, he may
be held personally liable as a debt collector without piercing the
corporate veil.” Id. Considering all approaches, the 6th Circuit found the
analyses within the district courts as most persuasive. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held “that subjecting the sole
member of an LLC to individual liability for violations of the FDCPA
will require proof that the individual is a ‘debt collector,’ but does not
require piercing of the corporate veil.” Id. at 437-38.

2008]

First Impressions

381

QUESTION TWO: Whether the use of “attorney letterhead” from a
debt collector constitutes “[t]he false representation or implication that
any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an
attorney.” Id. at 438.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit adopted the “least-sophisticatedconsumer” test to determine whether the attorney’s action in this case
was deceptive. Id. The court noted that the letter from the LLC gave
“repeated indications that it came from a law firm.” Id. at 439.
Specifically, the court remarked that the words ‘law offices’ appeared in
the letterhead, on the signature block, and on the remittance voucher. Id.
Furthermore, the court found that “the inclusion of ‘Account
Representative’ [did] not necessarily blunt ‘any effect in the reader’s
mind caused by’ the repeated references to ‘The Law Offices of Michael
P. Margelefsky’ and the payment voucher directing remittance to
‘Michael P. Margelefsky.’” Id. at 440.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether one could have reasonably concluded under the
“least-sophisticated-consumer” test that the collection letter was
“susceptible to a belief that it [was] from an attorney.” Id. at 442.
United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant, who has not been charged with
conspiracy may receive a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G §
2D1.1(b) for a co-defendant’s possession of a firearm during a drug
transaction. Id. at 474.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit noted that section 2D1.1(b) of the
Sentencing Guidelines states that a defendant’s base offense level for a
drug trafficking offense must be increased by two levels “[i]f a
dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” Id. at 474. The
court emphasized that application of the enhancement applies broadly,
during “relevant conduct.” Id. The court defined relevant conduct under
the Sentencing Guidelines to include, “in the case of jointly undertaken
criminal activity . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of
others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy).” Id. at 475. Thus, the court reasoned that “whether the codefendants are charged as conspirators is of no consequence,” and found
that a jointly undertaken activity is sufficient for the enhancement. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that a defendant may receive a
sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) of the Sentencing
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Guidelines for a co-defendant’s possession of a firearm during a drug
transaction if the crime was a jointly undertaken activity. Id.
United States v. King, 516 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether a court can consider only offenses that “took
place within a limited time period” when considering what offenses
qualify as a ‘prior conviction for a similar offense’ under § 2D1.1(a)(1)
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 425–26.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument “that
a prior offense triggers § 2D1.1(a)(1) only when it is recent enough to
count in calculating the criminal history category” under Chapter 4 of the
Guildeliness as well. Id. at 427. The court stated that “both the text of the
Guidelines and other circuits’ conclusions contradict [the defendant’s]
arguments.” Id.
First, the 6th Circuit reasoned that “even if § 4A1.2(e) does create a
default time-limit within Chapter 4, there is no reason to believe that a
limit in a chapter on criminal history would necessarily span all other
chapters.” Id. at 428. The court articulated that the “Sentencing
Commission’s explicit rejection of the 15-year limit in this section does
not mean that the Commission intended to apply the 15-year limit in
sections that say nothing about such a limit.” Id.
Second, the 6th Circuit stated that section 4A1.2(e) was not a
default time-limit applicable to Chapter 2 of the Guidelines, because “[i]f
§ 4A1.2(e) applied as an unstated background rule, the explicit mention
of § 4A1.2(e) in Chapter 2 would be unnecessary.” Id. Third, the court
found that the defendant’s contention that “§ 2L1.2’s waiver of §
4A1.2’s time limit proves that § 4A1.2(e) is indeed a default for Chapter
2,” was unavailing because the term “‘without regard to the date of
conviction’ [in the application notes to section 2L1.2] . . . [was] simply
intended to make it clear that Chapter 2’s no-time-limit default continues
to apply even when the Guidelines draw upon terms from provisions that
do contain time limits.” Id. at 430.
Fourth, the 6th Circuit articulated that although “the words and
rules of Chapter 4 do not exist in isolation[,] . . . when considering
whether Chapter 2 includes the time limits of Chapter 4, we are not faced
with a situation where Chapter 2 is somehow lacking important
information” and thus “Chapter 2 stands alone and does not require
consideration of Chapter 4.” Id. at 431. Fifth, the court stated “that there
is no reason to conclude that the time limits that the Commission created
for § 4A1.2(e) were intended to signal a global policy that disparages all
use of convictions older than fifteen years.” Id. at 431–32. Finally, the
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court found that “§ 2D1.1(a)(1) unambiguously precludes the application
of § 4A1.2(e)’s time limits,” noting that even if the court was to find
some ambiguity in § 2D1.1(a)(1), “there would not be enough ambiguity
to justify applying the rule of lenity.” Id. at 432.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit held that “§ 2D1.1(a)(1) contains no
default time limit that would bar consideration of convictions older than
fifteen years of age.” Id.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) authorizes criminal
forfeiture of the proceeds of any offense that does not have a statutory
basis for criminal forfeiture but permits a civil forfeiture in connection
with that offense. Id. at 369.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit first noted that other circuits
considering the issue interpreted section 2461(c) to authorize criminal
forfeiture as a punishment for any act for which civil forfeiture is
authorized. Id. The court agreed with the weight of authority and
affirmed the district court’s finding that 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) provides the
statutory basis for criminal forfeiture. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that section 2461(c) authorizes
criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of any offense that permits a civil
forfeiture in connection with that offense but does not provide a statutory
basis for criminal forfeiture. Id.
United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “[W]hether multiple and simultaneous violations of [26
U.S.C. § 5861(d)] constitute one criminal act or several separate acts.”
Id. at 731.
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit agreed with several courts of appeals
that unanimously held that “there is one unit of prosecution under §
5861(d) for each non-registered firearm possessed, and that an individual
accordingly may be prosecuted for each non-registered firearm he is
alleged to have possessed.” Id. at 732. The court noted that section
5861(d) of the Internal Revenue Code makes it “illegal for an individual
‘to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record,’ and thus evade the
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excise tax that would have been due had the firearm been properly
registered.” Id. at 729.
The court then commented that the excise tax applied to “sawed-off
shotguns, modified rifles, machine guns, silencers, and, as pertinent here,
‘destructive devices,’ meaning ‘any explosive . . . grenade’” and that the
charges against the defendant included such destructive devices. Id. at
729, 730. The 7th Circuit then adopted the reasoning of the 5th and 9th
Circuits, agreeing that the purpose of the statutory scheme for § 5861(d)
dictates that “each non-registered firearm (and thus each instance of tax
evasion) corresponds to one unit of prosecution.” Id. at 732.
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that the defendant’s
multiplicity challenge to 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) must fail, because “the
discernable need to prosecute each violation of the excise tax on firearms
transfers explains why multiple and simultaneous violations of § 5861(d)
may be prosecuted separately.” Id.

NINTH CIRCUIT
In re Weinstrin; Weinstrin v. Gill, 512 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether a law firm could object to a motion filed by a
trustee in bankruptcy which sought to augment the trustee’s
administrative fund with money “subtracted from accumulated funds
held as collateral for [a] [l]ender’s loans.” Id. at 535.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that the debtor in bankruptcy was
represented by the law firm during three negotiations with a lender for
financing. Id. The court found that each of the negotiated agreements
contained a clause that “[n]either the lender” nor any of the Collateral
shall at any time be subject to surcharge or assessment, whether pursuant
to Bankruptcy Code § 506(c) or otherwise.” Id. The court opined that the
“waiver of surcharge or assessment against the collateral is
comprehensive,” and “applies ‘at any time.’” Id. The court further
recognized that the waiver was approved by the law firm, and that the
firm was aware that there would have been certain administrative
expenses, thus, “it was not through ignorance or inadvertence that no
provision was made to pay them.” Id. at 535–36.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the firm had “no direct,
pecuniary interest in the encumbered assets of the estate,” and that the
waiver effectively barred the claim of the law firm. Id.
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Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the plaintiff had “the right to visually display
song lyrics in real time with song recordings, as well as print song lyrics,
without holding anything more than the § 115 [of the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332] compulsory licenses it already possesses.” Id. at
525.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that the plaintiff’s karaoke device
satisfied the statutory definition of an audiovisual work as defined by the
Copyright Act. Id. at 527–28. The court recognized that section 101 of
the Copyright Act defines an audiovisual work as a product “consisting
of ‘a series of related images’ that are ‘intrinsically intended to be shown
by the use of machines’” Id. The court also found that the plaintiff’s
“visual representation of successive portions of song lyrics that [the]
device projects onto a television screen constituted ‘a series of related
images.’” Id. at 528.
In addition, the court also recognized that an essential function of
the karaoke device “is its ability to indicate to the consumer exactly
when to sing each lyric.” Id. Consequently, the court observed that while
section 101 of the Copyright Act did not require that an audiovisual work
have sound, the plaintiff’s karaoke device with its images of successive
portions of song lyrics were “intrinsically intended to be shown by the
use of machine . . . together with accompanying sounds.’” Id. The court
found that the karaoke device was able to indicate to the consumer when
he or she should sing each lyric because “it utilize[d] a machine to
project the song lyrics ‘in real time’ with the accompanying music.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the karaoke device at issue
was an audiovisual work as defined by the Copyright Act. Id. at 529.
Therefore, “in addition to any section 115 compulsory licenses necessary
to make and distribute phonorecords and reprint license necessary to
reprint song lyrics, [the plaintiff was] also required to secure
synchronization licenses to display images of song lyrics in timed
relation with the recorded music.” Id.
United States v. Banks, 506 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether a conviction of Violence in the Aid of a
Racketeering Enterprise (“VICAR”) “requires the defendant to have
committed the violent act for the primary or sole purpose of maintaining
or enhancing his purpose in the criminal enterprise, or whether it is
sufficient that he was motivated only in part by such purpose.” Id. at 761.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first looked to the rulings of its sister
circuits, finding that all “have concluded that VICAR’s purpose element
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is satisfied even if the maintenance or enhancement of his position in the
criminal enterprise was not the defendant’s sole or principal purpose.” Id.
The court then determined that “the purpose element is met if ‘the jury
could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime
because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in
the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that
membership.’” Id.
The court proceeded to interpret the language of the statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1959(a), and concluded that Congress did not intend “for
VICAR to apply only to defendants acting solely (or primarily) for the
purpose of entering a gang or maintaining or enhancing their position
within it.” Id. at 762. The court also declined to use the rule of lenity
because “an examination of the text, context, and purpose of the VICAR
statute leaves no reasonable doubt that the purpose element is satisfied
‘whether [the defendant’s gang-related purpose] be primary or
secondary.’” Id. at 764.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the purpose element of
VICAR “does not require the Government to show that the defendant
was solely, exclusively, or even primarily motivated by a desire to gain
entry into, or maintain or increase his status within, the criminal
organization.” Id.
United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether or not our government is required formally
to seek extradition and execute an arrest warrant when it believes
extradition is futile.” Id. at 1114.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit observed that the 2nd Circuit addressed
the issue in United States v. Blanco, holding that requiring a formal
extradition for a defendant from Colombia would have been futile, and
that “[d]ue diligence does not require the government to pursue goals
that are futile.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit and held
that, “where our government has a good faith belief supported by
substantial evidence that seeking extradition from a foreign country
would be futile, due diligence does not require our government to do so.”
Id.
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Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 508 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether a false promise to list shares on a national
exchange like the NASDAQ is material” under section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 920.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held
that an omitted fact “is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.” Id. at 919. Applying this standard, the court found that the
defendant’s promise to list its shares on NASDAQ was material because
a “NASDAQ listing carries objective benefits that directly and positively
affect corporate earnings, investor returns, and a stock’s pool of potential
shareholders.” Id. at 921. The court remarked that shares listed on
NASDAQ benefit from exemption from Blue Sky registration, “have
greater liquidity . . . and thus have smaller spreads, on average, than
shares traded on the OTCBB [“Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board”],” and
listing shares on NASDAQ “may attract a larger pool of investors than
listing on the OTCBB.” Id. at 921–22.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the defendant’s
misrepresentations in the Final Prospectus regarding listing its shares on
NASDAQ were material because a reasonable shareholder “would have
wanted to know where the new shares would be trading and would have
viewed the fact of defendant’s nonlisting ‘as having significantly altered
the total mix of information made available.’” Id. at 922.
United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether the Bail Reform Act permits the pretrial
detention of individuals who pose a danger only to a foreign
‘community.’” Id. at 1087.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit first rejected the lower court’s
contention that the term “community” in the Bail Reform Act is limited
to a geographic location within the court’s jurisdiction. Id. The court next
rejected the argument that the term community must be located within
the geographical jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 1088. The court
also reasoned that excluding foreign lands from the definition of
“community” in the Bail Reform Act would mean that “a court would be
able to try a defendant under the laws of the United States for a crime the
effects of which are felt abroad, but be unable to detain the defendant
who committed the crime despite clear and convincing evidence that he
continues to pose a danger to the same foreign community.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that a district court “may
consider the threat that a defendant poses to a foreign community in a
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case in which the defendant has been charged with an offense under
American law, the effect of which occurs abroad.” Id.
Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 513 F.3d 949
(9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: “Whether the shipper or the carrier bears the risk if a
freight forwarder, broker, or consolidator fails to forward a freight
payment, or if a consignee fails to forward a freight payment. . . .” Id. at
958.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit disagreed with the appellant-shipper’s
argument that equitable estoppel should bar the carrier’s collection of the
freight charges from the shipper. Id. The court considered Olson
Distributing Systems, Inc. v. Glasurit America, Inc., but did not apply the
shipper’s argument from that case that the “risk of loss should rest with
the carrier” because the extreme facts there bore little resemblance to the
instant case. Id. The 9th Circuit instead agreed with the 4th, 5th, and 11th
Circuits, which held that “a shipper should bear the risk when it chooses
to pay for freight charges through a broker rather than directly to the
carrier.” Id. at 959.
The court found that policy reasons supported the holdings. Id.
Specifically, the 9th Circuit recognized that: (1) the “economic reality”
of the freight industry is that the freight forwarder usually has little net
worth, profiting on the fees paid by carriers and shippers; (2) that
“[c]arriers must expect payment will come from the shipper, although it
may pass through the forwarder’s hands;” and, (3) that “[w]hile the
carrier may extend credit to the forwarder, there is no economically
rational motive for the carrier to release the shipper” because “[t]he more
parties that are liable, the greater the assurance for the carrier that he will
be paid.” Id. The court further reasoned that “the shipper, and not the
carrier, is in the best position to avoid liability for double payment by
dealing with a reputable freight forwarder, by contracting with the carrier
to eliminate the shipper’s liability, or by simply paying the carrier
directly. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that equitable estoppel did not
bar the carrier’s recovery of freight charges from the shipper. Id. at 960.
United States v. Lowry, 512 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the prosecution bears the burden of proof for
establishing the defendant’s lack of individual aboriginal title, or whether
a claim of individual aboriginal title is an affirmative defense where the
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defendant bears the burden of proof, for a violation of 36 C.F.R. §
261.10(b) and (k). Id. at 1195.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s
argument that “the phrase in 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b), ‘without a specialuse authorization, or as otherwise authorized by Federal law or
regulation,’ merely ‘negates an element of the crime’ and may not be
shifted to the defendant.” Id. at 1199. The court stated that it was a
“settled rule” that “an indictment or other pleading founded on a general
provision defining the elements of an offense, or of a right conferred,
need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other
distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere, and that it is
incumbent on one who relies on such an exception to set it up and
establish it.” Id.
The 9th Circuit articulated that while “[t]he government bears the
burden of proving possession, use or occupancy of the land,” under 36
C.F.R. § 261.10(b) and (k), the “‘without’ clause simply recognizes the
existence of [certain] exceptions to the general prohibition against
residing in the nation’s forests.” Id. The court reasoned that “the person
claiming individual aboriginal title must demonstrate continuous
individual occupation that commenced before the land in question was
withdrawn from entry for purposes of settlement,” because “a defendant
who relies upon an exception to a statute made by a proviso or distinct
clause, whether in the same section of the statute or elsewhere, has the
burden of establishing and showing that he comes within the exception.”
Id. at 1199–1200. The 9th Circuit explained that the approach was
practical, because “it would be ‘far easier for the defendant to present
evidence’ of her Indian ancestors and their history of land occupancy to
establish that the exception applies than for the government to do so.” Id.
at 1200.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that “where authorization [to
occupy Forest Service land] is claimed by virtue of individual aboriginal
title, it is an affirmative defense [to 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) and (k)] to be
raised by a defendant,” who thereafter bears the burden of establishing
such individual aboriginal title.” Id. at 1201.
In re Wind N’ Wave; North Sports, Inc. v. Knupper (509 F.3d 938 (9th
Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(4), which
governs compensation for creditors’ attorneys in bankruptcy cases,
allows for expenses incurred by a creditor in appealing or defending a
lower court’s award or denial of fees. Id. at 940.

390

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:363

ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that while the statute was silent
regarding compensation for expenses incurred by a creditor in appealing
or defending an appeal, statutory silence does not foreclose a fee award.
Id. at 942. The court recognized that other circuits as well as its own
prior holdings have expressly granted compensation for litigation above
a fee award, using fee-shifting statutes even when those statutes did not
expressly allow for it. Id. The court applied the same rationale to the
instant case, concluded that the petitioning creditors could file for the
appropriate application for recovery of expenses under Section
503(b)(4). Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that Bankruptcy Code Section
503(b)(4) allows creditors to recover expenses incurred in appealing or
defending a lower court’s award or denial of fees. Id.

TENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. v. Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether nonconsensual sexual contact constitutes a
forcible sex offense and therefore a crime of violence” that warrants a
sixteen-level upward sentence increase under Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1086–87.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit found that “a sex offense may be
committed by means that do not involve ‘physical’ force, yet the offense
may still be forcible.” Id. at 1089. It noted that “the word ‘force’ does not
necessarily connote the use of physical compulsion.” Id. at 1088. Further,
the court observed that “where one party has sufficient control of a
situation to overcome the another’s [sic] free will, force is present.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the use of “disparities in
situational power or influence” between the victim and the perpetrator
that prevent the victim from giving consent, meet the definition of
“force” under Section 2L1.2 of the Guidelines; therefore nonconsensual
sexual conduct constitutes a forcible sex offense. Id. at 1089.
United States v. Contreras, 506 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether enhancement for obstruction of justice in §
3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines applies when a defendant’s
obstructive conduct occurred during the prosecution of state charges
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preceding the federal indictment, but both federal and state charges were
based on the same underlying conduct.” Id. at 1034.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit agreed with the defendant’s argument
that the language of the Guidelines confines the obstruction enhancement
to obstruction of the administration of justice with respect to the ‘instant’
offense, meaning the federal prosecution. Id. at 1038. However, the court
held that where a defendant’s obstructive conduct impedes or delays
prosecution by both federal and state authorities, the enhancement was
applicable. Id. at 1038. The court noted that “[a] contrary interpretation
would have strange consequences.” Id. at 1038–39.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit concluded that “the obstruction of
a state investigation based on the same facts as the eventual federal
conviction merits a § 3C1.1 enhancement.” Id. at 1039.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the district court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction to enforce an inmate’s motion seeking specific enforcement
of a plea agreement pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 2255. Id. at 1189.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit considered the Supreme Court’s
decision in Santobello v. New York, which held “that when a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise . . . of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled.” Id. at 1190. Based on this holding, the court noted that “the
Supreme Court implicitly recognized that the court that accepts a guilty
plea has jurisdiction to enforce a plea agreement if the government is in
breach.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Adopting the approach of the 1st and 7th Circuits
and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Santobello, the 11th Circuit held
that “the district court in which a defendant pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement has jurisdiction over a motion filed by the
defendant to enforce the agreement under § 2255.” Id. at 1191.
Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir.
2007)
QUESTION: Whether emotional damages are recoverable under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.S. § 794. Id. at
1190.
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ANALYSIS: In determining what remedies are available under the
Rehabilitation Act, the court considered several factors, including: a
“contract metaphor the Supreme Court has found useful in determining
the available remedies under Spending Clause legislation”; actual
contract law; and “the Bell v. Hood presumption, which the Barnes Court
reaffirmed” by stating that “federal courts may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done.” Id. at 1203.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit concluded that “emotional
damages are available to make whole the victims of the violations of §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 1204.
United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) of the Aggravated
Identity Theft statute “requires the government to prove (1) that [the
defendant] stole the identification of another person, in order to show the
possession or use was ‘without lawful authority,’ and (2) that [the
defendant] knew that the identification . . . belonged to another actual
person.” Id. at 604.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit addressed the first question by looking
to the plain language of the statute. Id. at 607. The court noted that the
statute simply required that “the transfer, possession, or use of the means
of identification of another person to be ‘without lawful authority.’” Id.
The court of appeals reasoned that Congress could have narrowed the
scope of the provision by including the terms “stolen” or “theft” as it had
in the preceding statutory section. Id. at 608. The court then explained
that Congress had clearly intended to “prohibit a wider range of activities
. . . than just theft.” Id.
Turning to the second question, the 11th Circuit used the plain
language of the statute to reject the defendant’s interpretation of the
provision’s requirement that one “knowingly transfers, possesses, or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person.” Id. at 609. The court explained that “[t]he fact that the word
‘knowingly’—an adverb—is placed before the verbs ‘transfers,
possesses, or uses’ indicates that ‘knowingly’ modifies those verbs, not
the later language in the statute.” Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, a
plain reading of the statute indicated that Congress had not intended to
extend the knowledge requirement to the entire subsection. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that section 1028A(a)(1) did not
require the government to prove that the defendant stole the identity of
another person in order to show that the possession or use was “without
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lawful authority,” or that the defendant knew that the identification
belonged to another person. Id. at 608, 610.
Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether or not the Tax Court used the appropriate
valuation methodology in computing the net asset value of CCC [a C
corporation for tax purposes] to determine the value of . . . interest in
[the] CCC for estate tax purposes on the date of death.” Id. at 1318.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit’s valuation
methodology in Estate of Dunn, based upon “historical overview,
discussion, and precedential authority.” Id. at 1319. Under the 5th
Circuit’s rationale, “a 100% dollar-for-dollar discount was mandated for
CCC’s entire contingent $51 million capital gains tax liability.” Id. The
11th Circuit explained that this economic market reality theory assumed
several factors, including the CCC’s liquidation on the date of death, the
valuation date, and that “all assets of CCC are sold, regardless of the
parties’ intent to liquidate or not, or [despite] restrictions on CCC’s
liquidation in general.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Under de novo review, the 11th Circuit vacated the
judgment of the Tax Court and remanded it with instructions that “it
recalculate the net asset value of CCC on the date of [] death . . . using a
dollar-for-dollar reduction of the entire [] built-in capital gains tax
liability of CCC, under the arbitrary assumption that CCC is liquidated
on the date of death and all assets sold.” Id.
Chen v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: What level of conduct constitutes “assistance” in
persecution for purposes of deciding whether an alien is ineligible for
asylum and withholding of removal. Id. at 1258.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit first noted the importance of assessing
the individual’s “personal culpability” as opposed to the overall
persecution. Id. at 1258–59. The court then examined other circuit court
decisions which had addressed the issue, and agreed with the 7th
Circuit’s holding that there is a “distinction between ‘genuine assistance
in persecution and inconsequential association with persecutor.’”
Additionally, the court also adopted the 2nd Circuit’s distinction between
“active conduct having ‘direct consequences for the victims,’ and
conduct merely ‘tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in
nature.’” Id. at 1259.
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CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that the personal conduct
must be “active, direct and integral to the underlying persecution” to
qualify as “assistance” and not “merely indirect, peripheral and
inconsequential association.” Id.
Scheerer v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether the regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1), which
provides that “[i]n the case of an arriving alien who is placed in removal
proceedings, the immigration judge does not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate any application for adjustment of status,” is valid. Id. at 1249.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit applied the two-step Chevron test,
deciding that the validity of the regulation was more properly analyzed
under the second step that examines whether the regulation is “based on
a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 1250–51. The court
found that the “regulation appears fully consistent with the broader
statutory framework governing adjustment applications, in which
Congress has divided adjudication functions between [Department of
Justice] and [Department of Homeland Security]” and in which Congress
“has authorized those departments to fill the gap as to specific
application procedures.” Id. at 1252.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “the Attorney General did
not exceed his authority in promulgating the amended 8 C.F.R. §
1245.2(a)(1)” and upheld the regulation as valid. Id.
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Office of
Workers’ Comp., 508 F.3d 975 (11th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether the director correctly concluded that the term
“massive lesions” was “merely one of several ways of describing the
condition known as complicated pneumoconiosis” to create a rebuttable
presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 718.304(b). Id. at 983.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that “the term ‘massive lesions’
means lesions revealed on autopsy or biopsy that support a diagnosis of
complicated pneumoconiosis” and therefore “a physician need not
employ the magic words ‘massive lesions’ in order to satisfy the
requirements found in Section 718.304(b).” Id. at 986.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “until the Secretary
provides further guidance on this matter, § 411(c)(3)(B) and
§ 718.304(b) are met if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that
the [decedent’s] autopsy reveals lesions that support a diagnosis of
complicated pneumoconiosis.” Id. at 987.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir.
2007)
QUESTION: Whether an exclusive field of use licensee has standing
to bring a patent infringement action without joining the patent holder,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. at 1276–77.
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit began by noting that “an exclusive
licensee has standing to sue in its own name, without joining the patent
holder, where ‘all substantial rights’ in the patent are transferred.” Id. at
1276. While noting that the Supreme Court had not considered the
standing of an exclusive field of use licensee to sue, the court analogized
the exclusive field of use license to the “claim-by-claim exclusive
license” at issue in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully & Jeffery Mfg. Co. Id. at
1277–78. The court explained that both licenses “divide the scope of a
patent right by its subject matter,” thereby increasing the “potential for
multiple litigations against any one defendant and among the licensees
themselves” arising from “a single act of infringement.” Id. The court
reasoned that “[t]o alleviate this risk, this court’s prudential standing
requirement compels an exclusive licensee with less than all substantial
rights, such as a field of use licensee, to join the patentee before initiating
suit.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that “an exclusive field of
use licensee does not have standing to sue in its own name without
joining the patent owner” under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). Id. at 1279.
Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Lab., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2007)
QUESTION: Whether a requirement exists to join “a patent owner
when an exclusive licensee does not possess all substantial rights in the
patent.” Id. at 1374.
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit examined Supreme Court precedent
on the issue of joinder in patent infringement cases, noting that
Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America requires
the joinder of patent owners and their licensees. Id. However, the Federal
Circuit observed that it had previously construed this joinder requirement
on its own to be “one of prudential rather than constitutional standing.”
Id. The court determined that the primary reason for the joinder
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requirement under Independent Wireless was “the possibility that the
alleged infringer would be subject to multiple actions.” Id. Thus, finding
“no such danger” in this case, the court held joinder unnecessary. Id.
CONCLUSION: “[W]hen a patentee joins an exclusive licensee in
bringing a patent infringement suit in a district court, the licensee does
not lose standing to appeal even though the patentee does not join in the
appeal.” Id.
HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a remand based on declining supplemental
jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(c) is within the class of remands
described in [28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c), and thus barred from appellate
review by § 1447(d).” Id. at 665.
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit noted that “[a]lthough we have not
yet addressed this issue, several other Courts of Appeals, relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, . . . have
held that review of a remand order based on declining supplemental
jurisdiction is not barred by section 1447(d).” Id. However, the court
noted that the Supreme Court holding in Powerex stated that “a remand
order need only be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction to be beyond the reach of appellate courts
under § 1447(d).” Id. at 666. Thus, the Federal Circuit explained that
when a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over state claims,
it “strips the claims of the only basis on which they are within the
jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 667.
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that “a remand based on
declining supplemental jurisdiction must be considered within the class
of remands described in § 1447(c) and [is] thus barred from appellate
review by § 1447(d).” Id.
DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2008)
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff is entitled “to a jury trial on
disputed jurisdictional facts that also implicate the merits of plaintiff’s
cause of action.” Id. at 1291.
ANALYSIS: The Federal Circuit reviewed the approaches of other
regional courts, which considered “the degree of intertwinement between
the jurisdictional facts and the facts underlying the merits of the cause of
action to determine whether dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is
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appropriate, or whether resolution of the issues must await summary
judgment proceedings or trial on the merits.” Id. The court adopted the
same approach and held that the “degree of intertwinement of
jurisdictional facts and facts underlying the substantive claim should
determine the appropriate procedure for resolution of those facts.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that a district court does
not have to hold a preliminary hearing “rather than awaiting jury trial on
the merits, to resolve the jurisdictional issues.” Id.

